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Making use of ten years of daily data, this paper examines whether banking sector 
co-movements between the three largest Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) can be attributed to contagion or to interdependence. Our tests based on 
simple unadjusted correlation analysis uncover evidence of contagion between all 
pairs of countries. Adjusting for market volatility during turmoil, however, 
produces different results. We then find contagion from the Czech Republic to 
Hungary during this time, but all other cross-market co-movements are rather 
attributable rather to strong cross-market linkages. In addition, we construct a set 
of dummy variables to try to capture the impact of macroeconomic news on these 
markets. Controlling for own-country fundamentals, we discover that the 
correlations diminish between the Czech Republic and Poland, but that 
coefficients for all pairs remain substantial and significant. Finally, we address the 
problem of simultaneous equations, omitted variables and heteroskedasticity, and 
adjust our data accordingly. We confirm our previous findings. Our tests provide 
evidence in favour of parameter instability, again signifying the existence of 
contagion arising from problems in the Czech Republic affecting Hungary during 
much of 1996. 
 
Keywords: contagion, interdependence, macroeconomic news, banking sector, 
stock returns 
 
JEL classification numbers: F30, F40, G15  
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Tartuntaa vai riippuvuutta? Keski- ja Itä-
Euroopan maiden pankkisektorien välinen korrelaatio 
osakemarkkinoilla 
Suomen Pankin tutkimus 
Keskustelualoitteita 15/2006 
Terhi Jokipii – Brian Lucey 




Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan kolmen suurimman Keski- ja Itä-Euroopan maan 
pankkisektorin välisiä yhtäaikaisia hintaliikkeitä osakemarkkinoilla käyttäen päi-
vittäistä aineistoa kymmenen vuoden ajalta. Tavoitteena on selvittää, aiheutuvatko 
nämä hintaliikkeet ns. tartuntailmiöstä vai pankkisektorien välisistä riippuvuuksis-
ta. Yksinkertaisen korrelaatioanalyysin perusteella kaikkien pankkisektoreiden vä-
lillä esiintyy tartuntaa. Tulokset kuitenkin muuttuvat, kun analyysissä kontrolloi-
daan volatiliteetin vaikutusta markkinahäiriöiden aikana. Tšekki aiheuttaa tar-
tuntareaktion Unkarissa, mutta muissa tapauksissa kyse on pikemminkin 
voimakkaista riippuvuuksista markkinoiden välillä. Tutkimuksessa käytetään li-
säksi dummy-muuttujia, jotta saataisiin selville makrotaloudellisten uutisten vai-
kutus näillä pankkimarkkinoilla. Kun tarkastelussa kontrolloidaan jokaisen maan 
omien makrotaloudellisten tekijöiden vaikutusta, havaitaan, että Tšekin ja Puolan 
välinen korrelaatio heikkenee. Kaikissa tapauksissa korrelaatiokertoimet pysyvät 
kuitenkin merkittävän suuruisina ja tilastollisesti merkitsevinä. Lopuksi tarkastel-
laan simultaanisuuden, puuttuvien selittävien muuttujien sekä heteroskedastisuu-
den vaikutusta. Aikaisemmin saadut tulokset pysyvät tällöinkin voimassa. Kaiken 
kaikkiaan tulokset kertovat sellaisesta parametrien epästabiilisuudesta, joka viittaa 
siihen, että ongelmat Tšekin pankkisektorilla aiheuttivat tartuntaa Unkarissa vuo-
den 1996 aikana. 
 
Avainsanat: tartunta, riippuvuus, makrotaloudelliset uutiset, pankkisektori, 
osaketuotot 
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Banking crisis is hardly a new phenomenon. In fact, the development of the 
international banking sector has consistently been marred by failures, generating a 
diverse array of mechanisms to reduce their strength and impact. In more recent 
times, the incidence of banking and financial sector crises has intensified and their 
effect on the domestic and international economy has become even more 
profound. Understanding both the nature and the causes of dramatic co-
movements, as well as the cross-country and cross-market transmission of shocks 
with a view to gaining an insight into market linkages, has consequently become 
of major empirical and analytical interest in international finance. 
  Evaluating whether contagion occurs and under what circumstances, as well 
as gaining a better awareness of inter-market relationships is important for several 
reasons. Above all, policy makers are concerned with maintaining financial 
stability which in an enlarged economic union requires the supervision of several 
economies with distinct characteristics and systems. Understanding the impact 
that a negative shock to one country could have on another, can aid in diffusing a 
threat of systemic crisis, or at least in diminishing the impact on neighbouring 
economies should such a crisis occur. Distinguishing between contagion and 
interdependence has further important implications for monetary policy, optimal 
asset allocation, risk measurement as well as for capital adequacy, since 
forecasting the reaction of one country to a crisis in another is only possible if the 
relationship remains stable through time. 
  Much of the academic literature in this field has focussed on analysing the 
extent to which financial spillovers to both mature as well as to emerging markets 
exist in order to identify channels of transmission of both positive and negative 
shocks to foreign countries. With the recent European Union (EU) enlargement, 
attention has shifted towards the Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs), concentrating on understanding the effect to which spillovers of global 
financial crises affect transition economies (See for example Fries, Raiser and 
Stern, 1999; Darvas and Szapáry, 2000; Gelos and Sahay, 2001; Murzuch and 
Weller, 2002). To date however, only very few empirical papers have focussed on 
the existence of contagion to between these countries. 
  Our paper contributes to this literature by analysing the CEE banking sectors 
during a period of development in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the 
relationships that have existed and how they have changed with time. Our analysis 
builds on the advances in the literature in this field by specifically applying the 
case of the CEE banking sector indices to a variety of tests that concentrate on the 
econometric problems that have arisen when assessing whether the transmission 
of shocks has intensified during a period of turbulence. We define contagion as a 
structural break that produces a change in the relationships between markets  
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during a period of turbulence. Interdependence on the other hand is a divergent 
phenomenon whereby stability persists, and no change in the relationships 
between markets is evident. We employ the period between 1994 and 1998 as our 
period of turmoil since all three markets underwent significant market 
developments, policy initiatives as well as crises during this time and further aim 
to establish how these relationships were affected by domestic macroeconomic 
conditions by distinguishing between the impact of good and bad macroeconomic 
news announcements. Significant problems within these markets during their 
development have rendered them as an important as well as interesting laboratory 
for studying the issues of contagion versus interdependence. To the best of our 
knowledge, such analysis has not yet been performed for the Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
  Our tests based on the unadjusted correlation coefficients indicate the 
persistence of contagion between all pairs of countries. Adjusting for the increase 
in market volatility during the turbulent period however, we find evidence of 
contagion stemming only from the Czech Republic to Hungary. All other market 
co-movements during this time appear to rather be attributable to the continuation 
of strong cross-market linkages. We further correct for own country fundamentals 
by introducing a set of dummy variables that proxy macroeconomic news 
announcements. We find that correlations between the Czech Republic and 
Poland do diminish, but that coefficients for all pairs remain substantial and 
significant. Finally, following Rigobon (2003), we adjust our data to account for 
problems of simultaneous equations, omitted variables and heteroskedasticity. We 
confirm our previous findings. Our tests provide evidence in favour of parameter 
instability in the transmission of shocks, providing further evidence in favour of 
the existence of contagion between the Czech Republic and Hungary during much 
of 1996. The direction of causality is further confirmed through the 
implementation of a granger causality test. Our results are broadly in line with the 
literature whereby far less evidence of contagion is uncovered when certain 
econometric problems are addressed. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short 
overview of definitions, theories and tests of contagion. In Section 3, briefly 
documents the evolution of the CEE banking systems. Section 4, describes the 
data employed in our analysis. Section 5 presents our empirical methodology and 





Contagion has been defined in many different ways in the literature, including the 
transfer of any shock across countries (Edwards 2000). Eichengreen and Rose 
(1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define contagion as the situation where 
the knowledge of crisis in one country increases the risk of crisis in another 
country. Edwards (2000) goes on to restrict the term economic contagion to those 
situations where the magnitude with which a shock is transmitted exceeds what 
was expected on the ex ante basis of ‘fundamentals’. In this paper we consider 
contagion to be a structural break producing an intensification of relationships 
during a period of turmoil.
1 
  There are several reasons why contagion can occur. One type of fundamental 
cause is a common shock, for example a major economic shift in industrial 
countries, a change in commodity prices or a reduction in global growth. Such an 
extreme event can trigger crisis and result in large capital outflows from emerging 
markets leading to increased co-movements in asset prices and capital flows.
2 
Trade linkages which include linkages through direct trade and competitive 
devaluations can additionally cause contagion. A crisis in one country can cause a 
reduction in income and a corresponding reduction in demand for imports, thereby 
affecting exports, the trade balance and related economic fundamentals.
3 Finally, 
contagion can be the resultant effect of financial linkages. In a region where 
integration is high, a crisis in one country can have direct financing effects on 
other countries through trade credit reductions, foreign direct investment and 
other capital flows.
4 
  In addition to the fundamental causes outlined above, it is possible to explain 
contagion through the existence of investor behaviour theories.
5 One such theory 
considers the role of liquidity problems, whereby losses in one country may 
induce investors to sell securities in other markets in order to raise cash in 
anticipation of greater redemptions.
6 Additionally, if banks experience a marked 
deterioration in the quality of their loans to one country, these banks may attempt 
to reduce the overall risk of their loan portfolio by also minimising their exposure 
in other high-risk investments, which could include other emerging markets. 
                                                 
1 Other authors adopting similar definitions of contagion include Bonfiglioli, Corsetti, English, 
Favero, Forbes, King, Loretan, Pericoli, Sbracia, Susmel, Rigobon, Wadhwani. 
2 For theoretical models of common shocks, see Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Masson (1998). 
3 For a detailed discussion of trade linkages, see Gerlach and Smets (1995), Eichengreen, Rose and 
Wyplosz (1996), Glick and Rose (1998), and Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini and Tille (2000). 
4 For a detailed discussion on financial linkages, see Goldfajn and Valdés (1997) and Van 
Rijckenghem and Weder (2001). 
5 For a more detailed discussion on investor behaviour theories of contation see Classens and 
Forbes (2004). 
6 For examples of literature in this field, see Valdés (1997) and Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler 
(2001).  
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Faced with liquidity problems, investors may be required to sell other assets in 
their portfolios, ultimately leading to a fall in asset prices outside of the crisis 
country causing the disturbance to ripple through a variety of markets. Moreover, 
incentive structures and risk aversion can additionally add to contagion.
7 A crisis 
in one emerging market may prompt investors to sell holdings in other emerging 
markets in order to maintain a certain proportion of a country’s or region’s stock 
in their portfolio. Similarly risk aversion can cause investors to sell assets in 
which they are ‘overweight’ in order to remain close to their benchmarks. 
Moreover, if a large number of investors are evaluated based on similar 
benchmarks, or have fixed country weights in their portfolios this could lead to 
extreme price declines following a shock to one asset. Finally, information 
asymmetries and imperfect information may lead investors to believe that a crisis 
in one country could be followed by comparable problems in a similar or 
neighbouring country. Effectively, if a crisis reveals weak fundamentals, investors 
may rationally conclude that similar countries may face equivalent problems, 
thereby causing contagion. 
 
 
Testing for Contagion 
Much of the empirical work on measuring the existence of contagion is based on 
comparing correlation coefficients for interest rates, stock prices and sovereign 
spreads between markets during a relatively stable period with a crisis or turbulent 
period (King and Wadhwani, 1990; Boyer, Gibson and Loretan, 1999; Loretan 
and English, 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Corsetti, Pericoli and Sbracia, 
2002). According to this approach coupled with the definition adopted in this 
paper, if two markets are naturally moderately correlated during periods of 
stability, then a shock to one market will result in a significant increase in market 
co-movements. This increase constitutes contagion. If on the other hand, the 
relationships do not change significantly after a shock to one market, and stability 
in the transmission mechanism persists, then continued market co-movements can 
be inferred to as being driven by strong real linkages between the two economies. 
Such stability in parameters over time would denote interdependence. Based on 
these assumptions, contagion implies that cross-country linkages are 
fundamentally different after a shock to one market while interdependence implies 
no real change to relationships. 
  More recently, the literature has pointed out various flaws in the 
aforementioned tests stemming from data issues. Stock market data in particular 
suffers from problems of heteroskedasticity, simultaneous equations and omitted 
variables, which as a result can render traditional techniques for testing for 
structural changes inappropriate. More specifically, heteroskedasticity in asset 
                                                 
7 See among others Schinasi and Smith (2001) and Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2004).  
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price movements can cause estimated cross-market correlations to increase after a 
crisis, even if there is no increase in the underlying correlations. Similarly, 
changes in omitted variables such as economic fundamentals, risk perception and 
preference, can cause a similar increase in asset price correlations even when 
contagion is not present. Endogeneity or feedback effects add to this since it is 
almost impossible to control for these effects when estimating the effect of a crisis 
in one country on another. Recent work has thus focussed on making more 
restrictive identifying assumptions and has moved towards testing for the stability 
of parameters during a period of crisis in order to assess whether the transmission 
mechanism differs significantly during a high and a low volatility period. Here 
any rejection of parameter stability indicating instability in the transmission 
mechanism could be considered as evidence of contagion. Authors addressing 
these econometric issues have generally found far less evidence of contagion than 
those that fail to do so. 
  Most of the literature on banking contagion has generally focussed on the 
transfer of shocks through the interbank market. Allen and Gale (2000) show that 
the possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure 
of interregional claims. They find that complete claims structures are shown to be 
more robust than incomplete structures. Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (2000) 
investigate the ability of the banking sector to withstand the insolvency of one 
bank and whether the closure of one bank generates a rippling effect throughout 
the system. They find that contagion arises from unforeseen liquidity shocks ie 
Banks withdrawing interbank deposits from another bank. Gropp and Vesala 
(2004) examine the number of banks that have in a given country to experience a 
large shock in the same period via the use of co-exceedances. They find 
significant evidence of cross-border contagion in the EU, attributing their findings 
to cross-border interbank exposures. In our paper we consider the investor 
behaviour theories explained above and analyse the contagious effect that is 
brought about by the highly correlated abrupt decline in the prices of an entire 
class of stocks. In this paper, we are interested in analysing the effect that market 
turmoil has had on banks and therefore focus our analysis on the behaviour of 




3  Central and eastern european banking system 
Having endured over a decade of substantial reform and stabilization, banking and 
financial sector development in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland finds 
itself in its final stages. The privatization of large banks has ultimately been 
completed, and foreign strategic owners, most of them EU-based banks, dominate 
the banking sector. After an enormous clean up of portfolios, the standardization 
of banking sector regulations according to EU rules along with the new ownership 
structures, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are finally facing the same 
issues challenging most industrialized nations. Statistics relating to the evolution 
of the banking sectors of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are presented 
in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3. 
 











Main part of the recapitalization program completed in fiscal 
costs up to the year indicated in % of GDP of that year 
8.9% 7.2%  1.6% 
Fiscal costs of the recapitalization program up to the year 
2000 in % of GDP in 2000 
11.8% 6.8%  1.4% 
 
 
Table 3.2  Evolution of the central and 
      eastern european banking sectors 
 
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Market value of banking index (US$)       
Czech Republic    1515  1138  1824 927  470 1433 
Hungary   23  202  532  1058  1362  1627 
Poland    998  1354 2849 3517 6152 8472 
Foreign ownership (% of net assets)       
Czech  Republic    23 24 30 39 48 55 
Hungary    79 83 93 89 91 91 
Poland  3  4  14 15 17 47 70 
 
 
Table 3.3  Banking sector of the Czech Republic, Poland and 
     Hungary 
 
 Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland 
  1991 1994 1997 2000 1991 1994 1997 2000 1993 1994 1997 2000 
# Active 
banks  24 52 53 40 36 43 44 39  104  82 83 74 
% Total 
domestic 
controlled  83 65 57 35    84 37 31 55 51 47 27 
% Total 
foreign 
controlled  17 35 43 65    16 63 69 45 49 53 73  
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The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland all encountered similar structural 
problems during the development of their banking systems. The Czech Republic 
however faced with additional troubles relating to the dissolution of the federal 
country. First, the CEECs had inherited underdeveloped, undercapitalized and 
badly managed banks from the past, having a strong impact on developments 
during the 1990s. At the outset of the transition, several key reforms were 
implemented. A two-tier banking system with separate functions for the central 
bank and commercial banks was introduced in place of the traditional mono-bank 
system. Furthermore, privately owned banks were admitted, and foreign banks 
and joint ventures were granted access. The licensing policy for most kinds of 
banking business was liberalised and both the legal and the supervisory system 
were adjusted (Kawalec, 1999). 
  Together the largely liberal licensing policy and the unreliable legal 
framework and supervisory system, resulted in the establishment of a large 
number of newly founded banks engaged in unsound practices.
8 The state owned 
commercial banks which were borne from the mono-bank system, subsequently 
suffered from an inherited burden of bad loans. The banking system generally 
lacked capital and banking skills, and political intervention in the activities of 
state owned banks was persistent. These deficiencies, coupled with the uncertain 
economic environment culminated in the quick accumulation of bad loans, and the 
subsequent failure of several banks (Reininger et al, 2001). 
  The scope and severity of the banking sector distress varied substantially 
between countries. In the Czech Republic, the banking sector suffered probably 
the most prolonged period of difficulty. Problems starting already in the early 
1990s had by 1993 already resulted in the closure of a number of banks. By 1996, 
the Czech banking system experienced a severe crisis. Initially, the problems were 
confined to small banks that could not meet capital requirements (IMF, 1997). In 
August 1996, the Kreditní and Investiční Banka, the nation’s sixth largest, 
collapsed. Its fall resulted in the loss of EUR 370 million. In September 1996, the 
CNB placed Agrobanka, the largest private bank and the fifth largest overall, 
under forced administration. An auditor estimated losses in that case to be EUR 
280 million. In all, 12 of 60 banks failed during the crisis. Six of these due to 
bankruptcy, and the rest under forced administration. As of June 1996, 39 percent 
of bank loans were ‘classified,’ which means that ‘there existed uncertainty about 
their repayment’ (Freedom House, 1998). In Hungary and in Poland the problems 
were smaller in scale. In the second half of 1993, eight banks in Hungary, 
accounting for around 25 percent of the financial system assets, were deemed 
insolvent. In Poland on the other hand, seven out of nine treasury-owned 
commercial banks, accounting for 90 percent of credit, the Bank for Food 
                                                 
8 The cases of Komercní Banka and credit unions in the Czech Republic serve as examples in this 
respect.  
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Economy and the co-operative banking sector in 1991 experienced insolvency 
problems. Recapitalization costs together amounted to around 1.9 percent of GDP 
by 1993 (Beim, 2005). 
  Although not all countries experienced a fully fledged banking crisis, all 
undertook large bank recapitalization programs mostly between 1992 and 1996. 
Table 3.1 presents the fiscal costs
9 that culminated from these bank 
recapitalization programs, and highlights the extent of the expenses faced by these 
economies during this time. The table shows the year when to a large extent the 
recapitalization was completed in each country. The figures are reported in 
percent of GDP in the year of completion as well as in percent of GDP in 2000 
(Reininger et al, 2001). 
  By around 1997, Hungary and Poland had managed to stabilize their bank 
systems via these programmes. The Czech Republic however faced continuing 
problems. In addition to the costs borne from these programs, large amounts of 
public funds were used up in preparing the country’s largest banks for 
privatization. By 2000, the accumulated fiscal costs, since the introduction of the 
reforms, amounted to around 11.8 percent of GDP. These costs however are 
separate from the failure of Investicní a Postovní Banka (IPB) which were 
estimated at around EUR 3 billion (around 4.8 percent of GDP in 2000). Poland 
was the most successful of these economies in terms of total costs. The 
accumulated costs of recapitalization were below 1.5 percent of GDP in 2000 
(Reininger et al, 2001). At least in part, this success can be attributed to the design 
of the programs, which lessened the incentive for moral hazard. Bank managers 
were provided with incentives for improving the performance of the banking 
institutions, and the effective management of bad loans was encouraged. It was 
the early tackling of bad-loans that minimized the fiscal costs presented in Table 
3.1. Poland’s relative success could further be credited to the relatively small size 
of the Polish banking sector to GDP. Between the Czech Republic and Poland lies 
Hungary, with fiscal costs at around 6.8 percent of GDP. 
  Together market reforms and exogenous shocks worsened the stock and flow 
position of the state-owned commercial banks, leading to the rapid increase in the 
volume of bad debt and non-performing loans. Consolidation therefore became 
necessary and contrary to the Czech Republic and Hungary, Poland adopted a 
decentralized approach for the management of this problem. The Polish approach 
proved more efficient, disallowing the accumulation of problems, forced banks 
and their new owners to partly share cots of the clean-up and prevented the re-
emergence of problems. By contrast, the method adopted by Hungary and the 
Czech Republic was full of moral hazard, inefficiency and subsequently proved 
costly for the banking sector in general (Hughes et al, 2001). 
                                                 
9 Fiscal costs here generally refer to the costs of recapitalization and losses incurred through 
protecting deposits either implicitly or explicitly through government deposit insurance schemes.  
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  Privatization and foreign ownership too played and important role in the 
development and transition of the banking systems of the CEECs. Generally in 
this respect, if the supervisory and regulatory regime is very weak, or non-
existent, or if a disruption to depositor confidence occurs, then the case for swift 
privatization may be diminished. The privatization of state owned banks has its 
own distinct benefits. Private ownership generally provides better incentives for 
controlled risk taking behaviour of managers, limits government intervention into 
the allocation of credit. It further enhances the incentives to improve monitoring 
and screening technologies for banks, a particularly important function of banking 
institutions as stressed by modern financial intermediation theory (see Diamond, 
1984). In the CEECs, progress in the bank privatization process differed greatly. 
In Poland, strong political opposition to privatization and the desire to protect 
domestic banks from foreign competitors and maintain restrictions on foreign 
participation, the sale of public assets of the banking sector proceeded at a modest 
pace until 1999. With the lifting of restrictions on foreign participation in the 
Polish banking sector in 1998, foreign ownership increased dramatically. At the 
end of 1998, 31 (out of 83 in total) commercial banks together with three foreign 
branch banks accounted for around 43.7 percent of bank equity and around 17 
percent of total assets. By the end of 1999, 39 foreign-controlled banks out of a 
total of 77 commercial banks accounted for 50.2 percent of bank equity and 
around 42.7 percent of total assets (European Forecasting Network, 2004). In 
Hungary, privatization of the state-owned banks was considered as a final step in 
stabilizing and strengthening the banking system. It was agreed that banks should 
preferably be sold to strategic investors providing the necessary capital, 
technology and expertise. In practice this meant the sale of most state-owned 
banks to foreign banks. Six state-owned banks which together in 1995 had around 
31 percent of the market share were sold to foreign banks
10 (Sherif et al, 2003). 
The growing participation of foreign investors in the Hungarian market was 
further enhanced by the liberal licensing policy in respect of foreign banks setting 
up branches in Hungary. In the Czech Republic, a ‘voucher-type’ privatization 
scheme was implemented, regarded as a rapid and transparent way of transferring 
ownership from the public to the private sector, it ended up creating more 
problems than benefits. As an outcome of this scheme, most corporations and 
banks became owned by investment funds. Due to capital requirements, legal and 
other considerations however, these investment funds were mostly owned by 
financial intermediaries, creating a very connected, cross-ownership of banks and 
enterprises leading to serious long-term costs for the economy. As a consequence, 
all major banks were sold to foreign investors. At the end of 1997, 30 (out of 53 in 
total) banks were controlled by Czech private and public owners, while 23 were 
                                                 
10 In a first phase of privatization, the government retained a minority shareholding in these banks. 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) also participated as a minority 
shareholder in the privatization of three banks.  
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under foreign control. By the end of 2000, the total number of banks had declined 
to 40, with 26 controlled by foreign owners (European Forecasting Network, 
2004). 
  Banking supervision policy generally carried out by transition or emerging 
markets differs from more mature markets. In the absence of a market-oriented 
banking system, the supervisors of these economies were actually faced with 
establishing ‘the rules of the game’ and creating a ‘level playing field’ for all 
operatives within the financial market. In effect, this was largely a ‘learning-by-
doing’ process. Barth, Capiro and Levine (2001) provide a substantial data set 
relating to how regulatory regimes work and differ across nations. From their 
work, we are able to briefly compare the supervisory and regulatory regimes in 
place during the 1990s. Looking first at the degree of capital stringency the 
authors construct an index based on the degree of leverage potential for capital on 
one hand and on the sources of funds that are counted as regulatory capital on the 
other hand.
11 Here we see that generally, of the three countries Poland 
demonstrates the largest degree of capital stringency when compared to Hungary 
and the Czech Republic, in fact, in this respect, Poland lies at the lowest quartile 
of the EU group. These figures are plotted in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, in terms of 
supervision, their paper analyses the legal possibilities of supervisors to prevent 
and correct problems in the banking industry. The study captures formal power to 
take prompt correctitive action, to restructure and reorganise a troubled bank, or to 
declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent. Here, Hungary dominates the CEECs 
with almost maximum supervisory power. Interestingly, all three CEECs are at 
the upper quartile of the EU sample. These figures are shown in Figure 3.2. 
Finally looking at the number of supervisors per bank, the Czech Republic 
dominates with an average of two supervisors compared with Hungary’s one and 
Poland with only 0.5. Both Hungary and the Czech Republic lie in the upper 
quartile of the EU distribution, while Poland in contrast is in the lower quartile. A 
comparison with a number of EU countries can be seen in Figure 3.3. 
 
                                                 
11 Please refer to Barth, Capiro and Levine (2001) for a more detailed description of how the index 
is calculated.  
17 






















Source: Barth, Capiro and Levine (2000) 
Note: The capital stringency index measures the restrictiveness on the leverage potential and on 
the sources of funds counted as regulatory capital. Higher values constitute greater stringency. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Supervisory power 
 

















Source: Barth, Capiro and Levine (2000) 




Figure 3.3  Number of supervisors per bank 
 

















Source: Barth, Capiro and Levine (2000) 
 
 
All countries covered in our analysis experienced banking crisis in the initial 
phase of transition. While they differed significantly in their extent, the causes can 
largely be attributed to a combination of an inherited burden of bad loans of state-
owned banks, hugely liberal licensing policies coupled with supervisory and legal 
framework shortcomings. Furthermore, the lack of capital and banking skills the 
recessionary environment together with political intervention all contributed to 




For our empirical analysis, we make use of nine and a half years of daily data 
(July 1994 to end 2004).
12 We adopt the DataStream banking sector indices
13 for 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Adopting DataStream indices provides 
a comparative index for each country, which captures more than 75 percent of the 
total market. The DataStream indices are value-weighted indices based on key 
publicly quoted banks in the each country. The weighting is based on the market 
capitalization of each bank. The larger the market cap, the greater the weighting, 
giving an accurate reflection of the banking sector. These indices were obtained in 
national currency and their percentage changes were subsequently calculated. 
                                                 
12 The first date on which data was available for all three markets. 
13 Analysis was conducted on both the bank and financial sector indices for all countries, however 
due to the largely similar results obtained only the banking sector results are presented. This 
similarity is hardly surprising considering that between 85–88 percent of total assets of the 
financial system are held by banks for all three countries under analysis.  
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News Releases 
Furthermore, since no high frequency variables (eg daily data) that can 
approximate the fundamentals in each of the CEEC countries exist as far back as 
we would like, we employ an approach whereby we create a set of dummy 
variables constructed from macroeconomic news announcements. Making use of 
the LexisNexis news databank,
14 we conduct a number of searches focusing both 
on central bank and national statistical office releases as well as on the individual 
variables we wished to include. The variables of interest are: unemployment, 
short-term interest rates, consumer price index, terms of trade (or an indicator of 
market openness when not available), real gross domestic product (GDP), current 
account deficit. These indicators are considered to be the most widely adopted 
variables in the literature for assessing macroeconomic influence on the banking 
system stability (Demirgűç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hutchinson, 2002; 
Timmermans, 2001). For Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, we also 
include various other announcements; such as a change in exchange rate regime, a 
change in the country’s credit rating by a major rating agency, namely Standard 
and Poor’s, Moody’s or Fitch, or the decision by the central bank to intervene in 
the foreign exchange market. 
  Following Baig and Goldfjn (1999), we distinguished between ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ news by using simple guidelines – any credible attempt to restructure or 
improve the economic situation is deemed as ‘good’, whereas news that indicated 
a further decline of the real or financial sector is ‘bad’. The good (bad) news 
dummy series is assigned a ‘1’ on the release of favourable (unfavourable) 
macroeconomic news. A fall in inflation, better GDP growth, and an improvement 
in the terms of trade are all assigned a ‘good’ news dummy, as were a fall in the 
year-on-year consumer price index figures, lower unemployment figures, and a 
reduction in the current account deficit. Finally, we assume that the central banks 
followed a price stability or inflation targeting strategy and assign a ‘good’ news 
dummy to a decrease in the short-term interest rate, as set by the central bank. For 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, we additionally consider any news of 
the country’s move towards EU membership as ‘good’, together with an increase 
in the country’s credit rating by one of the major ratings agencies. Furthermore, 
we regard any move in exchange rate regimes towards a free-float to be positive 
and any rescue packages or funding given to the country by international 
organizations as favourable. 
  While the privatization of state-owned banks can in principle have benefits as 
well as costs, the overall general considerations of the incentive effects of private 
ownership, as well as empirical evidence on this issue support the view that the 
benefits outweigh the costs (EBRD, 1997). Private ownership generally provides 
                                                 
14 Our sources were limited due to lack of alternatives on LexisNexis. We made use of MTI 
Econews for Hungary, CTK for the Czech Republic and the Polish News Bulletin for 
announcements in Poland.  
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better incentives for more disciplined risk taking of managers along with the 
limitation of government intervention into the allocation of credit. Furthermore, it 
enhances the incentives for more effective monitoring and screening of banking 
institutions, ultimately improving the general stability and soundness of the 
banking system in which they operate. For this reason, we further consider any 
increase or speeding up of the privatization process as positive. 
  For ‘bad’ news the opposite is true. We assign a ‘bad’ news dummy variable 
when the rate of inflation increased, GDP growth declined or the terms of trade 
index worsened. Furthermore, a rise in consumer prices, an increase in 
unemployment or a fall in the interest rate is considered bad for the economy. 
Although very general, we assume that a rise in interest rates would signal non-
inflationary pressures and concerns of deflation resulting in notably below trend 
GDP growth and consequently a worsening economic situation. Again, for the 
Czech Republic, any delay in EU membership is considered ‘bad’, as was a fall in 
the country’s credit rating. We further consider a delay in the privatization process 
for banks operating in the Czech Republic, Hungary or Poland, as negative. 
  Once all the good and bad news series were created for each variable 
separately, we aggregate the series to obtain a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ news dummy 




Empirical work by Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000), has provided 
significant evidence in favour of a substantial effect that liberalization has on both 
liquidity and volatility. In our study, we are concerned with determining the extent 
to which correlations between market returns exist and therefore need to eliminate 
any outside effect that can affect our results. 
  As outlined in Section 2, each of the CEECs in our study experienced periods 
of significant market development during the first half of our sample, including 
events of both financial sector as well as stock market liberalization. We 
consequently include several measures to act as a control against these effects. 
  To capture financial market liberalization, we consider four distinct events as 
important; Bank ownership: a move towards privatization, Interest rates: date of 
liberalization; Credit control: elimination of controls; Deposits: the date when 
deposits in foreign currencies are allowed. Here the dummy series moves from 0 
to 1 in the period where the event took place. A similar dummy is created for the 
date of stock market liberalization in each of the CE3 countries. The dates 
capturing the events of interest are presented in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1  Financial and stock market liberalisation: 
     event  dates 
 




Bank ownership  Privatization of state 




(creation of ÁPV Rt) 
In 1993 Bank 
privatisation begins 
Interest rates  Liberalisation of 
interest rates in 1992 
Liberalization of 
interest rates in 1987 
for enterprises and in 
1992 for households 
Liberalisation of 
interest rates starting 
with 1990 










Ministry of Finance 








permission needed for 
short-term credit to 
non-residents lifted. 
Short term financial 
credit from residents 
to non-residents 
prohibited above a 
given limit. 
Deposits 01.01.01:Foreign 
deposits non longer 
require pre-approval 
01.07.00: Residents 




In 1990 deposits an 
foreign accounts 
allowed with limit 
Stock market liberalisation    







Source: National Central Bank and National Supervisory Authority. 
 
 
5 Testing  for  contagion 
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on assessing the nature of the 
relationships that have existed between the CEE economies over the last decade. 
In particular, we wish to determine whether different policies and regulations 
implemented during transition created any difference in terms of vulnerability to 
external shocks. We consequently test the null hypothesis H0 of no contagion, 
only interdependence, against an alternative hypothesis (H1) whereby contagion 
drives banking sector co-movements between the three largest CEECs.  
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  Each of our tests is executed on the residuals of a VAR.
15 The residuals are 
then subsequently split between the turbulent and tranquil periods. We define our 
turbulent period as that between 19th July 1994 and end 1998. The tranquil period 
on the other hand runs from January 1999 to end 2004. The VAR model takes the 
following form 
 
t t t u By x ) L ( A = +  (5.1) 
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In this standard VAR, x is a (1xN) vector of variables, A is a (NxN) matrix of 
coefficients, u is a (Nx1) vector of white noise disturbance terms, and L represents 
the lag operator (for example, List = xt-1). The x vector contains the daily change 
in the bank indices for Hungary  ) HU (
t bank , Poland  ) PL (
t bank  and the Czech 
Republic  ) CZ (
t bank . Each regression additionally includes the country control 
dummies outlined in Section 4, together with a world index controlling for the 
impact of global shocks. We estimate the VARs with the autoregressive order of 
two according to both the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criterion. For 




5.1 Unadjusted  correlation  coefficients 
We begin by estimating the unadjusted correlation coefficients of the daily 
changes in the banking sector indices of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Using the variance-covariance estimates from estimating (5.1), we calculate cross 
market correlation coefficients between each pair of countries during the total 
sample, turbulent and tranquil periods. The coefficients are then used to perform 
                                                 
15 The advantage of working with VAR residuals, as compared to structural residuals, is that the 
VAR represents and unconstrained reduced form, circumventing problems of simultaneity bias. 
Additionally, the use of a VAR structure allows for the controlling of serial correlation in stock 
returns and any exogenous global shocks.  
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the standard test of contagion pioneered by King and Wadhwani (1990). The 
results for the total sample banking sector cross-country correlations are presented 
in Table 5.1. All pairs demonstrate positive coefficients ranging from 0.21 for 
Hungary and Poland, to 0.29 for the Czech Republic and Poland. The data is 
further split into the turbulent and tranquil periods defined previously to allow for 
a comparison between sub-samples. At a first glance, we see that for all pairs of 
countries, turbulent period correlations appear to be larger than those for the 
tranquil period however from this analysis we are unable to determine whether 
this change in coefficients is statistically powerful enough to infer the existence of 
contagion. 
 
Table 5.1  Unadjusted correlations of the CEECs banking 
     index  returns 
 
 Czech  Republic  Hungary  Poland 
Total sample: LR test 52.18*** 
Czech Republic  1 0.28  0.21 
Hungary  0.29  1 0.27 
Poland  0.21 0.27  1 
   
Turbulent Period (1994-end 1998): LR Test 31.64***   
Czech Republic  1 0.45  0.32 
Hungary  0.45  1 0.27 
Poland  0.32 0.27  1 
   
Tranquil Period (1999-end 2004): LR Test 21.63***   
Czech Republic  1 0.10  0.11 
Hungary  0.10  1 0.18 
Poland  0.11 0.18  1 
Note: *, **, *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
LR Test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair wise correlations are 0. 
Each pair wise correlation is tested for the null that the correlation is 0. 
 
 
We therefore apply a two-sample t-test, and examine whether a significant 
increase in correlations in the crisis period is evident. We assume 
t
j , i ρ  to be the 
correlation coefficient between country i and country j over period t. Here the post 
crisis period is denoted ‘0’ and crisis period as ‘1’. The subsequent test 
















The correlation coefficients are transformed using a Fisher transformation, so that 
they are approximately normally distributed with a mean μt and variance 
2
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Where Xt and 
2
t S  are the estimated sample mean and variance following the 
Fisher transformation. The test statistic follows the t-distribution. The degrees of 































If the correlations increase significantly, then there are grounds for believing that 
these markets have moved away from relationships dictated by traditional 
movements of fundamentals. On the other hand, if the increases are not 
significant, then it is possible to assume that these markets are simply reacting to 
shocks that are common-cause. The critical value for the t-test at the one percent 
level is 1.282 so any test statistic greater than this value constitutes contagion (C), 
while any statistic less than that indicates no contagion (N). The test statistics for 
the unadjusted correlation coefficients are presented in Table 5.2. Table 5.2 
additionally summarises the results presented in Table 5.1 
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Table 5.2  Unadjusted correlation coefficients summary 
 
    Total Sample  Turbulent  Tranquil  Test Stat  Contagion? 
   ρ  σ  ρ  σ  ρ  σ    
Czech Republic                 
 Hungary  0.28  0.155  0.45 0.172  0.10  0.123 24.67  C 
 Poland  0.21  0.121  0.32  0.153 0.11 0.134  10.11  C 
Hungary                  
  Czech  Rep. 0.28 0.155  0.45  0.172 0.10 0.123  24.67  C 
 Poland  0.27  0.105  0.27  0.112 0.18 0.101  5.62  C 
Poland                  
  Czech  Rep. 0.21 0.121  0.32  0.153 0.11 0.134  10.11  C 
 Hungary  0.27  0.105  0.27 0.112  0.18  0.101  5.62  C 
 
 
Several patterns are apparent. In particular, considerable co-movement appears to 
be present, indicating that the banking sectors of the largest markets in Central 
and Eastern Europe have tended to move together, and have had a substantial 
influence on one another. For all pairs of countries, we find that the correlations 
increase significantly during the turbulent period when compared to the tranquil 
time. According to our definition, this provides evidence in favour of contagion. It 
is interesting to note that during the turbulent period, the correlations between the 
Czech Republic and Hungary is considerably larger (0.45) than the other pair wise 
correlations (Poland and Hungary; 0.27, Poland and the Czech Republic; 0.36). 
With respect to the differences in correlations between the turbulent and the 
tranquil periods, we find that the largest change appears to occur between the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, (around 77 percent). Correlations between the 
Czech Republic and Poland and Hungary and Poland on the other hand change by 
around 66 and 33 percent respectively. 
 
 
5.2 Controlling  for  own  country fundamentals 
Contagion can be thought of as co-movements between markets in excess of those 
that can be explained by co-movements of fundamentals. Following Ganapolsky 
and Schmukler (1998), Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) and Baig and Goldfajn 
(1999) who estimate the impact of various news announcements on the 
movements of different markets, we expand our analysis and control for own 
country fundamentals. Essentially we wish to analyse whether significant co-
movement between the banking sector indices of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland exists beyond these fundamentals since any remaining or unexplained 
correlation may be assumed to result from contagion. 
  The regression takes the following form, and is run with robust coefficients 





t x 1 it i t , i
, 10 N } { and T ,..., 1 t ; 3 , 1 i
Dummies R R
ϑ ≈ ε = =
ε + β + β + α = ∑ −  (5.6) 
 
Where x = b, g for good and bad news dummy variables and ∑Dummies = the 
aggregate good and bad news dummy variable for each country. Each regression 
additionally includes the country control dummies outlined in Section 4 and a 
world index controlling for correlation with the global market. The control 
variables are not reported in our results. 
  The results from the above regression are presented in Table 5.3. Looking 
first at the entire sample, we find that the lagged dependent variable is significant 
in all three cases with ‘good news’ proving to be statistically significant for 
Hungary. Here it seems that a release of ‘good news’, causes a 34 percent increase 
in the banking sector index. During the turbulent period, the lagged dependent 
variables are again significant for both the Czech Republic and for Poland, while 
the Czech banking index further falls around 15 percent on the release of negative 
macro news. Finally in the tranquil period, the lagged dependent variables again 
prove statistically significant for all three countries, while we see that the Czech 
index falls around 45 percent on ‘bad’ macro news, while the Hungarian index 
rises around 32 percent on ‘good’ news released. 
  The residuals from these regressions act as a further measure of contagion 
controlling for own country fundamentals. The residual correlation matrices for 
each of the sub periods are presented in Table 5.4. The correlations between the 
Czech Republic and Hungary appear to decrease over the total sample, increase 
during turbulence and remain unchanged in the tranquil period when compared to 
those figures obtained via the unadjusted correlation analysis presented in Table 
5.1. Despite the variance in the direction of the change between the correlation 
coefficients, the LR test statistic reveals statistically significant group-wise 
correlation of the residuals. This result implies that contagion exists well above 
and beyond the identified fundamentals, and that the banking sector correlations 
presented here are not principally driven by a single big macroeconomic news 
event. 
  Interestingly, the residual correlation coefficients between the Czech Republic 
and Poland have decreased significantly during all periods when compared to the 
unadjusted correlations presented in Table 5.1. Similarly there is a noticeable fall 
in the correlation coefficients between Poland and Hungary during all sub-
samples when compared to Table 5.1. This finding is in line with the results 
obtained under the analysis of adjusted correlation coefficients where we found no 
evidence of contagion but rather an indication that co-movements between these 
markets are attributable to strong real linkages. Here, controlling for certain real 
fundamentals, we are able to diminish the extent of the co-movement. Despite the 
observed fall in correlations, the LR test statistic remains statistically significant.  
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Table 5.3  Regression results with own country fundamentals 
 
Dependent variable: National bank index 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland 
Total sample: 1994–2004 
Constant 0.02  0.09  0.06 
 (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.21) 
Bank index-1 0.11  0.06 0.19 
 (2.77)***  (1.51)*  (3.25)*** 
Good news  -0.03  0.34  0.11 
 (0.16)  (1.52)*  (0.32) 
Bad news  -0.35  -0.21  -0.49 
 (1.02)  (0.77)  (1.11) 
Adjusted R
2 0.52 0.44 0.37 
Number of Obs.  2727  2727  2727 
      
Turbulent period: 1994–1998 
Constant 0.05  0.09  0.01 
 (0.12)  (0.22)  (0.15) 
Bank index-1 0.21  0.08 0.09 
 (2.98)***  (1.08)  (3.17)*** 
Good news  0.06  0.15  0.09 
 (0.26)  (0.31)  (0.12) 
Bad news  -0.15  -0.26  -0.55 
 (1.98)**  (1.31)  (1.12) 
Adjusted R
2 0.34 0.46 0.53 
Number of Obs.  1422  1422  1422 
      
Tranquil period: 1999–2004 
Constant 0.09  0.08  0.09 
 (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Bank index-1 0.09  0.07 0.12 
 (1.99)**  (1.52)*  (2.99)*** 
Good news  -0.16  0.32  0.25 
 (0.99)  (2.01)**  (1.23) 
Bad news  -0.45  -0.32  -0.51 
 (1.73)*  (0.93)  (0.46) 
Adjusted R
2 0.32 0.41 0.39 
Number of Obs.  1304  1304  1304 
Note: *, ** and *** denote rejection at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 




Table 5.4  Residual correlation matrix 
 
  Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland 
Total sample: 1994–2004 (LR Test: 34.24***) 
Czech Republic  1 0.36  0.17 
Hungary 0.26  1 0.26 
Poland 0.17  0.26  1 
      
Turbulent period: 1994–1996 (LR Test: 16.41***) 
Czech Republic  1 0.49  0.12 
Hungary 0.49  1 0.25 
Poland 0.12  0.25  1 
      
Tranquil period: 1997–2004 (LR Test: 24.12***) 
Czech Republic  1 0.10  0.11 
Hungary 0.10  1 0.12 
Poland 0.11  0.12  1 
Note: The LR test attempts to reject the null hypothesis that all pair-wise correlations are 
equal to zero. 
* denotes 10% significance level, ** denotes 5% significance level, *** denotes 
significance at 1% level. 
 
 
5.3  Bias in the correlation coefficient 
While the simple test of contagion based on correlation analysis above appears to 
return evidence of contagion between the banking sector indices of the CEEC 
economies, recent literature has highlighted a bias in the correlation coefficient 
central to this analysis. (Ronn, 1998; Boyer et al, 1999; Forbes and Rigobon, 
2002). Effectively, during periods of calm, a standard two factor model is 
assumed whereby the return in each market is a linear function of a set of 
common shocks (wt), which affect all markets, and an idiosyncratic shock (uit). 
For a set of N asset markets, this relationship is presented as follows 
 
T ,..., 1 t ; 3 , 1 i u w x it i t i it = = δ + λ =  (5.7) 
 
Where  λi and δi are the common factor (wi) and the idiosyncratic factor (uit) 
loadings respectively. The bias stems from an increase in asset return volatility 
that arises from an increase in volatility of both the idiosyncratic and common 
factors above, and proves to be especially large during periods of market turmoil, 
which, in effect, is the focus of this test. 
  The use of the unadjusted (or conditional) coefficient assumes the bilateral 
analysis of markets x and y, and a division of the data sample into a high variance 
(h) and a low variance (l) group, representing the turbulent and the tranquil  
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periods respectively. We start by estimating the correlation coefficient of the 
turbulent period according to the standard definition (5.1). The results are 
summarised in Table 5.2. 
  As discussed, it is possible that the increases in the correlations result from a 
bias due to market volatility during this time rather than purely from contagion. 
To assess the extent of this bias in our tests of contagion we repeat the analysis, 
this time adjusting the correlations to account for higher volatility of returns 
during periods of turmoil. This test assumes that spillovers are present only in one 
direction (ie from market x to market y; and not from y to market x). We 
consequently implement the test considering each of the three markets as the 
‘crisis’ country in turn. 


























= γ  (5.8) 
 
Where ρl is the low variance period correlation between market x and market y, 
2
i , l σ  and 
2
i , h σ  are the variance of asset returns in the low and high volatility periods 
of the of the ‘crisis’ country’s asset returns respectively. The new test statistic 









































=  (5.9) 
 
Where ρl is the correlation between x and y during the tranquil period, γh is the 
corresponding correlation coefficient in the turbulent period as obtained above.
16 
  These results are presented in Table 5.5. In adjusting for an increase in market 
volatility, we find a significant difference in the results obtained. At the one 
percent level of significance, we are again able to identify the existence of 
contagion stemming from the Czech Republic to Hungary. The high correlations 
between markets for all other pairs of countries appear to be driven by strong real 
linkages through economic fundamentals rather than through the existence of 
contagion. 
 
                                                 
16 See Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 for a more detailed discussion on the intuition behind this 
adjustment.  
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Table 5.5  Adjusted correlation coefficients 
 
    Total sample  Turbulent  Tranquil  Test stat  Contagion? 
   ρ  ρ  ρ    
Czech Republic           
 Hungary  0.29  0.33  0.08  5.22  C 
 Poland 0.21  0.22  0.07  0.96  N 
Hungary            
 Czech  Rep.  0.29 0.25  0.10  0.55 N 
 Poland 0.27  0.21  0.24  0.32  N 
Poland            
 Czech  Rep.  0.21 0.19  0.09  0.12 N 
 Hungary  0.27  0.16  0.11  1.08  N 
 
 
This result is interesting since it highlights that fact that marked differences may 
have existed in the resilience of the banking sectors of Poland and Hungary to 
shocks coming from the Czech Republic. From the brief analysis of their 
development in Section 3 we found that the greatest differences that existed 
between Poland and Hungary stemmed from disparities in their management of 
bad debt and non-performing loans together with their supervisory and regulatory 
policies. Poland adopted a centralized approach to problem management which 
appeared to be more efficient and disallowed for the accumulation of problems. It 
may be possible that this strengthened the system to the extent that they were less 
vulnerable to shocks from abroad. Furthermore, the degree of capital stringency, 
as presented in Figure 3.1, appears to have been significantly higher in Poland 
than in Hungary or the Czech Republic, almost equivalent to some countries in the 
EU. There is scope for further research into the reasons behind the Polish 




5.4 Heteroskedasticity,  simultaneous equations and 
omitted variables 
As indicated by Rigobon (2003), stock market data, on which we have based our 
analysis, can often suffer from problems relating to heteroskedasticity, 
simultaneous equations and omitted variables. As a result, under the assumption 
of heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis of stability can be rejected even if the 
coefficients are in fact stable. Consequently, the adjustment proposed by Ronn 
(1998), Boyer et al (1999), and Forbes and Rigobon (2002) is wrong and should 
not be used. 
  For the purpose of our estimations, we follow Rigobon (2003) in order to test 
whether we can verify the stability of parameters of a linear model in the presence  
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of heteroskedasticity, simultaneous equations and omitted variables. The test 
provides and alternative to the chow test whereby coefficients in a structural 
model are tested for structural change. Given the relationship that exists between 
the chow test and contagion, as discussed in detail in Dungey et al (2005), we 
considered this as a further test of contagion. 
 
Defining DCC window periods 
The test requires the calculation of the covariance matrices for a set of random 
variables (in our case the daily change in the CEE banking sector return indices) 
for two different sub-samples. In implementing the test, there is a trade off 
between the length of the time-period windows and the chance of test rejection. 
The longer the windows, the higher the likelihood that most shocks are 
heteroskedastic, increasing the chance of rejection. In this case the test will be 
rejected since all shocks are heteroskedastic rather than because parameters are 
unstable. On the other hand, too narrow windows will undermine the estimation of 
the covariance matrices. If the covariance matrices are too noisy, then the test is 
never rejected, therefore there is a tension between the quality of the estimation of 
the matrices and the likelihood of satisfying the assumption of heteroskedasticity. 
  For our analysis, rather than analysing the entire sample period, we 
concentrate only on our turbulent period (1994-end 1999) and split the sample 
into six-month intervals.
17 For each time frame we assess bi-variate relationships 
between the three countries being analysed. The time periods are defined and 
presented in Table 5.7. This test essentially examines whether the propagation 
mechanism between the pair-wise sets of countries change during the defined 
windows. 
 
Table 5.6  DCC window periods 
 
Period  Window 1  Window 2 
1  19th July 1994 – 31 December 1994  1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995 
2  1st January 1995 – 30 June 1995  1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996 
3  1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995  1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996 
4  1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996  1st January 1997 – 30 June 1997 
5  1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996  1 July 1997 – 31 December 1997 
6  1st January 1997 – 30 June 1997  1st January 1998 – 30 June 1998 
7  1 July 1997 – 31 December 1997  1 July 1998 – 31 December 1998 
8  1st January 1998 – 30 June 1998  1st January 1999 – 30 June 1999 
9  1 July 1998 – 31 December 1998  1 July 1999 – 31 December 1999 
 
 
                                                 
17 We also run the test on three-month and one year intervals. The results are broadly in line with 
those obtained for the six-month windows and are therefore not presented.  
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DCC Test 
The test is referred to as the determinant of the change in the covariance matrix 
(DCC), since it compares the change in the matrix determinants across sub-
samples, taking the determinant to express the statistic as a scalar. The DCC 
















y ˆ Ω  and 
t
x ˆ Ω  are the estimated covariance matrices between windows y and 
x in time period t defined in Table (5.7).  DCC ˆ σ  is an estimate of the relevant 
standard error of the statistic. Under the null hypothesis, there is no change in the 
covariance structure of asset returns resulting in the change in determinant to 
equal zero. If however, contagion increases volatility then the determinant will be 
greater than zero. The test hypotheses are characterised by 
 
0 DCC : H







Similarly to other tests of contagion, the DCC test is executed on the residuals of a 
VAR.
18 The residuals are then subsequently split between two windows y and x as 
defined above. For a more in depth analysis, we estimate three sets of VAR 
equations. The first VAR model is as per equation (5.1). Our second set of 
equations includes a domestic stock index for each country in order to try to 
capture the common factor effect. Including the domestic total market indices 
rules out market and sectoral effects and establishes a rough estimate of the 
idiosyncratic components of the country’s banking sector. This equation 
consequently allows us to analyze the full range of interaction between the 
banking sector indices between all of the three countries and allows us to gain an 
indication of the degree to which regional shocks were responsible for banking 
sector index movements. Finally, we estimate a third set of equations, this time 
including the full set of variables described above, together with the 
macroeconomic dummy variables described in Section 4. Here we wish to analyse 
the effect of regional macroeconomic news announcements on the patterns of 
banking sector pressure. 
  For each sub-sample, the covariance matrix is calculated from the reduced 
form residuals and the DCC statistic computed. The distribution of the 
determinant of the change in covariance matrices is estimated via a bootstrapping 
                                                 
18 The advantage of working with VAR residuals, as compared to structural residuals, is that the 
VAR represents and unconstrained reduced form, circumventing problems of simultaneity bias.  
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procedure based on sampling from the asymptotic distribution of the covariance 
matrix. The asymptotic distribution of the covariance matrix  i ˆ Ω  is given by 
(Hamilton, 1994, pp. 301) 
 
( ) () [ ] () () () y , x i ' D * D 2 . 0 N vech ˆ vech T
L
i i = Ω ⊗ Ω ⎯→ ⎯ Ω − Ω
+ +  (5.11) 
 
Where D is the duplication matrix defined as 
 
() ()
' D ) D ' D ( D
and vech Dvech




is the generalised inverse of D. 
  The bootstrap is obtained by: first, after estimating the covariance matrix in 
each of the time-period windows, generating several covariance matrices for each 
sub-sample using the asymptotic distribution of the covariance matrices. We then 
compute the determinant of the change between windows and subsequently 
evaluate the number of realizations for which DCC is above zero. This acts as a 
sort of p-value since the test is rejected if the mass is lower than 0.1 or greater 
than 0.9. The bootstrap is implemented assuming that the covariance matrices are 
serially correlated across regimes and uses the point estimate of the covariance 
matrix in a low-volatility regime and the change in the covariance matrix across 
regimes to generate random draws. The use of the bootstrapping procedure in this 
sense is beneficial since it allows us to obtain a description of the properties of the 
estimators using sample data points. In essence, the procedure comprises sampling 
repeatedly with replacements from actual data to obtain a distribution. 
 
Test results 
Table 5.7 presents our results for each of the three sets of VAR equations.
19 
Interestingly, we find slightly varying results between the different VAR 
specifications. The dummy variables here serve to capture the part of the 
propagation of shocks that could be transmitted through fundamentals. When we 
consider the relationship between the Czech Republic and Hungary together, this 
specification rejects the null of no contagion during the first half of 1996. It was 
during this time that in the Czech Republic, around 39 percent of banking sector 
loans were considered as ‘classified’ meaning that their existed a ‘degree of 
uncertainty relating to their repayment’ (Freedom House, 1998). Moreover this 
was the period directly preceding that of the crisis. During the second half of 
1996, all three VAR specifications return further evidence in favour of contagion 
between the Czech Republic and Hungary. This is the period when the Czech 
                                                 
19 For brevity, VAR results are not reported here.  
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Republic experienced severe banking sector distress causing a huge increase in 
variance of the banking sector index. These results indicate that during the second 
half of 1996, there is significant evidence in favour of propagation through the 
banking sector indices, as proxied by specification 1. Furthermore, ruling out 
market and sectoral effects we establish that the propagation additionally occurs 
through the idiosyncratic components of the country’s banking sector as well as 
through the market fundamentals during this time. 
 
Table 5.7  DCC results 
 
VAR  specification  1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Czech Republic with Hungary and Poland           
19th July 1994 – 31 December 1994        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1st January 1995 – 30 June 1995        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996        N  N  R N N N 
1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996        R  R  R N N N 
1st January 1997 – 30 June 1997        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1 July 1997 – 31 December 1997        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1st January 1998 – 30 June 1998        N  N  N  N  N  N 
1 July 1998 – 31 December 1998        N  N  N  N  N  N 
           
Hungary with the Czech Republic and Poland          
19th July 1994 – 31 December 1994  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1st January 1995 – 30 June 1995  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996  N  N  R      N  N  N 
1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996  R  R  R      N  N  N 
1st January 1997 – 30 June 1997  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1 July 1997 – 31 December 1997  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1st January 1998 – 30 June 1998  N  N  N        N  N  N 
1 July 1998 – 31 December 1998  N  N  N        N  N  N 
           
Poland with the Czech Republic and Hungary          
19th July 1994 – 31 December 1994  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1st January 1995 – 30 June 1995  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1 July 1995 – 31 December 1995  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1st January 1997 – 30 June 1997  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1 July 1997 – 31 December 1997  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1st January 1998 – 30 June 1998  N  N  N  N  N  N       
1 July 1998 – 31 December 1998  N  N  N  N  N  N       
Note:  VAR specification 1 corresponds to the estimation with bank index variables only. 
  VAR specification 2 corresponds to the estimation with bank index variables and a 
domestic stock market variable. 
  VAR specification 3 corresponds to the estimation with bank index variables, domestic 
stock market variables and the full set of good and bad news dummy variables. 
  R denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of parameter stability and subsequent rejection of 




These results would tend to confirm those obtained in Section 5.3. Moreover they 
indicate that directly preceding the crisis, shocks appear to be propagated via 
market fundamentals, while during crisis, shocks seem to additionally be 
propagated through the banking sector indices. Criticisms of the DCC test have 
pointed out that the main problems lie with its inability to evaluate whether 
rejection of the null is due to a parameter shift, or to the violation of the 
assumptions made on the heteroskedasticity under the null (see among others 
Billio, Lo Duca and Pelizzon, 2003). Furthermore, it has been shown that the 
results obtained via the DCC tests are largely dependent on the size of the 
windows chosen. 
  The nature of the DCC test however, assumes that the country (or countries) 
generating the increase in the variance is (are) known and does not therefore allow 
for a test of causality. In our estimations, since we are analysing the nature of 
relationships between the CEECs rather than analysing a single event or crisis, we 
can not be sure of the origin of turbulence from the test results obtained. We 
therefore try to determine the direction of the instability found by implementing a 
granger causality test. 
  The test considers whether x causes y in order to see how much of the current 
y can be explained by past values of y as well as whether adding lagged values of 
x can improve the explanation. y can be said to be granger-caused by x if x helps 
in the prediction of y. Setting the lag length equal to two, we run the test on the 
full sample, the turbulent and tranquil sub-samples, as well as on the two six-
month periods defined in the above analysis.
20 The results are presented in Table 
5.8. 
 
                                                 
20 Our tests of causality do not control for omitted variables, or for potential heteroskedasticity of 
the residuals and therefore the possibility of bias exists Cheung and Fujii (2001).  
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Table 5.8  Granger-causality test results 
 
Null hypothesis  Obs  F-statistic  Probability 
Total sample       
  HU does not granger cause CZ  2727  1.62  0.19 
  CZ does not granger cause HU    10.04  4.60E-05 
Turbulent period (1994–1998)       
  HU does not granger cause CZ  1161  0.97  0.38 
  CZ does not granger cause HU    4.97  0.01 
Tranquil period (1999–2004)       
  HU does not granger cause CZ  1564  0.66  0.45 
  CZ does not granger cause HU    1.32  0.08 
1st January 1996 – 30 June 1996       
  HU does not granger cause CZ  129  0.07  0.92 
  CZ does not granger cause HU    3.60  5.20E-05 
1 July 1996 – 31 December 1996       
  HU does not granger cause CZ  130  1.02  0.36 
  CZ does not granger cause HU    7.37  6.40E-05 
Note: CZ, HU and PL represent the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland respectively. 
 
 
In each case, the null hypothesis that the Czech Republic does not granger-cause 
Hungary is rejected. Interestingly, the causality appears to only run in one 
direction: from the Czech Republic to Hungary. These results confirm our 
previous findings and highlight the fact that problems in the Czech Republic 
appear to have had a significant negative impact on the banking sector of 
Hungary. Moreover, from these results, it is possible to assume that the rejection 
of parameter stability between the Czech Republic and Hungary can be pinpointed 




This paper examines the behaviour of price changes in the banking sector indices 
of the CEECs over the last decade. Making use of daily data for the three largest 
CEECs, we address various econometric issues that have arisen in the literature 
and apply a wide range of tests to analyse whether co-movements are attributable 
to contagion or to interdependence. 
  Our tests based on the unadjusted (conditional) correlations between a 
turbulent and a more tranquil period indicate that considerable co-movement 
appears to be present, suggesting that the banking sectors of the largest markets in 
Central and Eastern Europe have tended to move together, and have had a 
substantial influence on one another. Moreover, we find that this relationship 
exists above and beyond economic fundamentals identified and that banking 
sector correlations are not driven by a single macroeconomic news event.  
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  We further adjust for the increase in market volatility during our high 
volatility period and find varying results. We see that in this case, contagion 
appears to run only from the Czech Republic to Hungary. Despite the high 
correlations between the other pairs of countries, we are unable to find evidence 
of contagion and infer that such co-movements are rather attributable to close 
linkages through economic fundamentals. 
  Finally, following Rigobon (2003) we additionally account for problems of 
simultaneous equations, omitted variables and heteroskedasticity via the 
implementation of the distribution of the determinant of the change in the 
covariance matrix methodology (DCC). Our tests confirm our previous findings 
and provide evidence in favour of parameter instability, again signifying the 
existence of contagion. In particular, these results confirm those of the adjusted 
correlations since they highlight the existence of parameter instability between the 
Czech Republic and Hungary only. This instability seems to be present during 
much of 1996. This test however does not allow for the analysis of direction of 
causality. We thus implement granger-causality test, and find evidence of 
causality running from the Czech Republic to Hungary, providing additional 
verification for our previous findings. 
  Our results are broadly in line with previous literature in this field. Focussing 
merely on the narrow definition of ‘shift contagion’, many papers have found 
significant evidence of large co-movements in a variety of asset returns around 
crisis periods. However, addressing the various econometric problems highlighted 
in Section 2, far less evidence in favour of the existence of contagion is 
uncovered. 
  This paper has focussed on trying to assess the impact of market turmoil on 
the banking sector and for this reason we adopt the use of banking sector indices. 
Further research at the individual bank level could be interesting in gaining 
additional insight into cross-market linkages between these countries. Our brief 
analysis of the CEE banking sectors during the period of their development 
highlighted differences that seemed to exist resulting from various policies 
implemented during this time. In particular, we find that the greatest differences 
that could have attributed the varying degrees of susceptibility of Hungary to 
contagion from the Czech Republic relate to disparities in the management of bad 
debt and non-performing loans inherited together with the supervisory and 
regulatory policies adopted. From a policy point of view it might be useful to fully 
understand the reasons behind the differences in vulnerability of Poland and 
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